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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF AUSTRALIAN TRADEMARK
INFRINGEMENT DECISIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
U.S. TRADEMARK USE DEBATE
By Dr. Vicki T. Huang
There is considerable concern in U.S. trademark scholarship that
privileging the “likelihood of consumer confusion” test has expanded
trademark owners’ monopoly rights beyond traditional limits. An
unfortunate consequence of this expansion is a chilling effect on useful
and necessary artistic and commercial expression. To combat this, the
introduction of an Australian-style “trademark use” threshold test has
been vigorously debated. In Australia, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant has used the impugned sign as a badge of origin before
confusing similarity is assessed. Therefore, if the defendant has not
used the mark “as a trademark”, the case quickly resolves. However,
a small number of U.S. critics have argued that a “trademark use” test
will inevitably collapse into a labored, consumer-dependent inquiry,
thereby neutralizing any supposed efficiency gains. This study provides
an empirical analysis of Australian trademark infringement cases to
challenge these critiques. Specifically, this paper conducts a systematic
content analysis of all Australian infringement decisions under Section
120 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) reported over a twenty-year
period (January 1, 1996 through January 1, 2016) – 78 cases.
The empirical analysis shows that Australian cases that “turn on”
trademark use resolve 39 percent more quickly than cases that “turn
on” the issue of deceptive similarity. In addition, contrary to some U.S.
critiques of the trademark use test, Australian courts when assessing
use do not rely on questions of consumer confusion or an assessment
of factors outside the inherent features of the mark. The determinative
factors for Australian courts are the immediate context of the mark
(such as the surrounding packaging) and an objective determination of
the purpose and nature of that use (e.g., as a badge of origin or some
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non-trademark use) and whether any policy considerations should
apply.
This paper argues that there are three distinctive features of the
Australian trademark system that make a trademark use threshold test
a successful efficiency tool. These are: (1) the Australian concept of a
trademark as property, including an underlying history of infringement
as a strict liability harm where consumer confusion is not central to
liability; (2) the absence of a general tort of unfair competition
anchored in elastic concepts of consumer confusion; and (3) welldeveloped collateral actions which proscribe consumer confusion such
as common law passing off and actions under consumer protection
statutes. Because of the absence of these features in U.S. trademark
law, the results of importing an Australian-style trademark use test
would be difficult to predict. Nevertheless, it will be argued that the
benefits of a trademark use test as demonstrated in this article can
reinvigorate aspects the U.S. trademark use debate.
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INTRODUCTION
In the U.S., under the Lanham Act, to establish infringement of a
registered mark under section 321 or an unregistered mark under
section 43,2 the plaintiff must show ownership of a valid mark and that
the defendant’s use of the mark in connection with goods or services
causes a “likelihood of confusion.”3 With regard to infringement, the
likelihood of consumer confusion has been called “the litmus test”4 or
“touchstone” for establishing trademark liability.5
In contrast, under Australian trademark infringement law, the
plaintiff must first show the defendant’s impugned use is use of a mark
as a trademark, that is “as a badge of origin.” This operates as a
threshold test before confusing similarity between the plaintiff and the
defendant’s marks is evaluated. In the U.S., although there is some
inter-circuit dispute over the existence of a threshold “use
requirement,”6 it can be said that, prima facie, there is no requirement
to establish “trademark use” to find infringement.
1

Lanham Act § 32, 15 U.S.C § 1114 (2012).
Lanham Act § 43, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012).
3
See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
23:11.50 (2017) (“[F]or infringement of federally registered marks, what the Lanham Act requires
is that the accused use be ‘in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution or advertising
of any goods or services’ in a context that is likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception.
Similarly, for unregistered marks, the Lanham Act requires that the accused use be ‘on or in
connection with any goods or services’ and be likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception as
to the affiliation, connection or association of the accused person with the plaintiff or as to the
origin of the ‘goods, services or commercial activities’ of the accused person. Similar language
applies to false advertising claims.”) (citations omitted).
4
Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 414 (2010)
(“[T]rademark law centers its analysis on consumer confusion. With some significant exceptions,
the basic rule of trademark law is that a defendant’s use of a mark is illegal if it confuses a
substantial number of consumers and not otherwise.”).
5
See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion over Use: Contextualism in
Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1599 (2007).
6
See, e.g., Interactive Products Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 698 (6th
Cir. 2003) (holding that the defendant did not infringe by using the plaintiffs “laptraveler” mark
in the defendant’s URL “a2zsolutions.com/desks/floor/laptraveller/dkfl-lt.htm.”). See also
2

4
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A. The US Trademark Use Debate
Whether U.S. trademark law could or should include a threshold
trademark use test has been the subject of significant debate. Indeed, it
has been said that “[t]he debate over ‘trademark use’ is a hot-button
issue in intellectual property (‘IP’) law”7 and that “trademark use is all
the rage.”8 However, there are deep divides over many issues, including
(but not limited to) the doctrinal locus of use,9 its normative value, its
pragmatic intersections with tests of consumer confusion, and whether
express defenses for non-trademark use should be preferred.10
For example, with regard to doctrinal locus, “most trademark ‘use
advocates’ and ‘use critics’ agree that the Lanham Act does not
explicitly make trademark use an element of infringement.”11 However,
most scholars “differ over the doctrine’s implicit status.”12 “Proponents
of the doctrine . . . argue that the trademark use requirement has always
been a foundational principle of trademark law.”13 These advocates,
including Margreth Barrett, Stacey Dogan, and Mark Lemley, posit
that the use requirement not only underlies all U.S. trademark law,14
MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 23:11.50.
7
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92
IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1670 (2007).
8
Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of Source, U. ILL. L. REV. 773, 773 (2009).
9
See id. at 791.
10
See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Ninth Distinguished IP Lecture: Developing Defenses in
Trademark Law, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99, 152 (2009) (“However, as the scope of
trademark protection expands and the metes and bounds of protection become more uncertain, we
cannot rely exclusively on creative interpretation of the prima facie cause of action to establish
limits. Trademark law must more consciously develop defenses that reflect the competing values
at stake in trademark disputes.”).
11
McKenna, supra note 8, at 791 (citing Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1609; Graeme B.
Dinwoodie & Mark Janis, Dilution’s (Still) Uncertain Future, 105 MICH. L. REV. 98, 100 (2006)).
12
McKenna, supra note 8, at 791 (emphasis added).
13
Id. at 791. See also id. at 792-97 (providing a lengthy summary of the debate as to the textual
or formalistic search for the trademark use requirement); id. at 791 n.86 (“Use in commerce is a
requirement under both section 32 and section 43(a), though the requirement is articulated
somewhat differently in each section . . . . ‘Any person who shall, without the consent of the
registrant . . . , use in commerce . . . shall be liable.’”) (quoting Lanham Act. § 32(1)(a), 15 U.S.C
§ 1114(1)(a) (2006)).
14
Margreth Barrett, Finding Trademark Use: The Historical Foundation for Limiting
Infringement Liability to Uses “In The Manner Of A Mark”, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 893, 956
(2008) (“In summary, the Lanham Act’s legislative history makes it clear that Congress did not
intend for the section 45 definition of ‘use in commerce’ only to apply in the registration context,
but, in fact (at least at the time of enactment) associated the definition more directly with the
infringement context than the registration context. The ‘use in commerce’ definition conceptually
incorporates and perpetuates the essential ‘affixation or other close association’ (or ‘trademark
use’) requirement of the 1905 and 1920 trademark acts.”); see also id. at 960 (“A third way to
find the trademark use requirement in the Lanham Act infringement causes of action is to
recognize that the Lanham Act implicitly incorporates it from the common law, even in the
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but also has “always informed trademark practice.”15 In contrast, “use
critics,” such as Professors Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis, argue
that there is no trademark use requirement and that “use” is a concept
limited to the acquisition of rights.16
Although engagement with the debate appears to have waned over
recent years, the reasons for its initial attractiveness have certainly not
abated. One of the critical normative concerns in U.S. trademark law
has been that actionable consumer confusion has expanded unbounded.
For example, in trademark infringement law, actionable confusion has
traditionally meant consumer confusion as to the source of the goods
or services.17 However, under modern U.S. approaches, it appears that
actionable confusion has moved beyond confusion as to source18 and
now proscribes non-source confusion over non-competing goods.19
Some of these “non-source confusion” activities have become more
visible because of commercial activities on the Internet.20 For example,
actionable confusion has been litigated in the context of dilution,21
absence of express statutory language.”); see also id. at 962 (“Professors Dogan and Lemley
appear to recognize the existence of a trademark use requirement in the statutory language, but
also argue that a trademark use requirement is implicit in the likelihood of confusion standard
(whose factors take for granted that the defendant has used the mark to promote its own sales)
and in cases defining indirect infringement liability.”) (citations omitted).
15
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Trademark Use Requirement in Dilution Cases, 24
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 541, 542 (2012).
16
Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1609 (“There is no statutory language expressly supporting
the trademark use theory. Even proponents of the theory concede as much.”) (citations omitted).
17
MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 24:2 (“Today, the law of all state statutory and common law rules
governing trademark and service mark infringement is the same as that of federal law: there is
infringement if there is a likelihood of confusion as to source, sponsorship, affiliation or
connection.”).
18
Id.
19
See generally id., § 24:8 (“In view of the expansive nature of the test of likelihood of confusion
as to sponsorship, affiliation or connection, where is the outer limit of uses far removed from the
senior user’s usage which will still cause such confusion?”); see also Lemley & McKenna, supra
note 4, at 454 (arguing that the likelihood confusion test in relation to sponsorship or affiliation
has become too vague and “that trademark law can best deal with sponsorship or affiliation claims
by taking a page from history and returning this subset of cases to its roots in false advertising
law.”).
20
Stacey L. Dogan, Beyond Trademark Use, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 135, 139 (2010)
(describing the flux of search engine cases as being the “straw man” in the trademark use debate);
see also Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1600 (“Supporters of this position have been spurred
to excavate the theory in hopes of furthering a number of contemporary policy objectives,
primarily with regard to online contextual advertising and affiliation merchandising.”); see also
Barrett, supra note 14, at 894-95 (“the [I]nternet has provided increased opportunities for
innovative uses of other people’s marks to capture or divert online customers, to gripe or complain
about the trademark owner, to parody or criticize. . .”).
21
See, e.g., Moseley v. Secret Catalogue, Inc, 537 U.S. 418 (2003), superseded by Trademark
Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2(1), 120 Stat 1730 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. 1125 (2012)). See generally Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029
(2006); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 15; Robert G. Bone, Taking the Confusion Out of
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initial interest confusion,22 post-sale confusion,23 approval/affiliation
confusion,24 endorsement confusion,25 keyword advertising,26 and
potentially the infringement of hashtags.27 In these cases, while
“Likelihood of Confusion”: Toward a More Sensible Approach to Trademark Infringement, 106
NW. U. L. REV. 1307, 1314 n.35 (2012); Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark
Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927); Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public
Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L. J. 1165, 1191-94 (1948); Mark A.
Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L. J. 1687 (1999);
Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.
J. 1717 (1999).
22
See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1839, 1905-6 (2007) (describing initial interest confusion as “when a junior party uses a
competitor’s mark to attract the attention of consumers who otherwise likely would have avoided
the junior user altogether. Having generated this interest, the junior user then dispels any
confusion about the source of its products, hoping that the consumer will decide, for lack of time
or interest or because she has been persuaded of the junior user’s superior product, to purchase
the substitute product rather than continue her search.”). See generally Jennifer E. Rothman,
Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
105 (2005). See also Vicki Huang, Liability for “Invisible” Use of Trade Marks on the Internet,
28 AUSTL. INTELL. PROP. J. 51 (2018) (discussing Australian perspectives of initial interest
confusion).
23
See McKenna, supra note 22, at 1907-8 (describing post-sale confusion as making “actionable
the confusion of non-purchasers based on their post-sale interaction with a product, [which]
requires rank speculation about viewers’ future purchasing intentions.”) (citing Mastercrafters
Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.
1955)).
24
See generally Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1599. See also Lemley & McKenna, supra
note 4, 413-15, 428 (“We think the concept of sponsorship or affiliation, introduced to
accommodate these broader claims, is to blame for much of what ails modern trademark law.”
Lemley and McKenna argue that “trademark law needs to refocus on confusion that is actually
relevant to purchasing decisions. Specifically, it should anchor once again to the core case of
confusion regarding the actual source of the defendant’s product or service, the type of confusion
most obviously related to consumer decision making.”).
25
Rebecca Tushnet, What’s the Harm of Trademark Infringement?, 49 AKRON L. REV. 627, 627
(2016).
26
See generally John Benton Russell, New Tenth Circuit’s Standards: Competitive Keyword
Advertising and Initial Interest Confusion in 1-800 Contacts v. Lens.com, 30 BERKELEY TECH.
L. J. 993, 993 (2015) (“Since the advent of search engines, companies have used their competitors’
trademarks to manipulate search engine results and increase exposure to consumers online. This
practice, called ‘competitive keyword advertising’ originally used keyword meta tags now
obsolete, but today occurs through systems like Google AdWords. The AdWords system allows
businesses to create advertisements and bid on specific keywords, so that when users enter these
specific keywords into Google’s search engine, the search returns the created advertisement along
with other ads on the results page. Almost any keyword is available for bidding – including a
competitor’s trademarks. Thus, through this system companies can bid on their competitors’
trademark, even without the competitors’ permission.”) (citations omitted); Sarah Wells Orrick,
Deciphering Rosetta Stone: Why the Least Cost Avoider Principle Unlocks the Code to
Contributory Trademark Infringement in Keyword Advertising, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 805
(2013); Winnie Hung, Limiting Initial Interest Confusion Claims in Keyword Advertising, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 647 (2012); Kristin Kemnitzer, Beyond Rescue.com v. Google: The Future
of Keyword Advertising, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 401 (2010).
27
See generally Robert T Sherwin, #Have We Really Thought This Through?: Why Granting
Trademark Protection to Hashtags is Unnecessary, Duplicative, and Downright Dangerous, 29
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consumers may be confused in a nominal sense, that confusion is
arguably not the result of use by the defendant of the plaintiff’s
trademark as a badge of origin. For example, in initial interest
confusion cases where a defendant has used the plaintiff’s mark as a
meta-tag, the consumer does not even see the defendant’s use of the
impugned mark; the consumer only sees and is “confused by” the result
of that use.28
Although “[t]his expansion began for plausible reasons –
consumers might be confused to their detriment in at least some cases
in which the plaintiff and the defendant do not actually compete
directly,”29 the widening assumption that all types of consumer
confusion may be harmful has made it “impossible to establish
meaningful limits on what sorts of confusion are actionable.”30 There
is a concern that U.S. courts are finding infringement for “practices that
might be confusing in some sense, but that do not affect consumers’
decision-making process.”31 McKenna has argued that the idea that any
confusion is somehow harmful has led to a number of trademark
doctrines that seek to protect all elements of value or that sees all
consumer confusion as an actionable harm.32
B. Why This Expansion Is a Problem
Many trademark scholars would agree that the privileging of
consumer confusion has had consequential harms. These harms include
a chilling effect on socially valuable (i.e. nominal, decorative, and
descriptive) but unlicensed uses of marks,33 the inhibition of free
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 455 (2016) (discussing the USPTO guidelines on registrability of hashtags
as per U.S.P.T.O. TMEP §1202.18 (Oct. 2013)).
28
Huang, supra note 22, at 56-57.
29
Lemley & McKenna, supra note 4, at 414.
30
Id. at 422.
31
Id. at 414.
32
See McKenna, supra note 22, at 1915 (“Virtually every significant doctrinal development in
the last century has given mark owners greater control over the use and meaning of their
marks. Strong marks have been the obvious – and intended – beneficiaries of expanded
protection, as trademark law has aimed to reserve to mark owners the entire value of ‘their’
marks.”). See also William McGeveran & Mark P. McKenna, Confusion Isn’t Everything, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 253 (2013) (“Yet trademark law's structure now encourages courts to
act otherwise, as if confusion itself were the ultimate evil with which trademark law is concerned
and as if its optimal level were zero. Trademark adjudication increasingly fetishized confusion
over the last half century while simultaneously expanding its scope to cover dramatically more
situations.”); Lemley & McKenna, supra note 4, at 453 (“Trademark law has expanded
dramatically in the last century to the point where it now prohibits conduct by companies that
seems unlikely to confuse consumers in any material way. The result is a long series of seemingly
absurd decisions. We think the problem is that courts have presumed that if consumers are
confused at all, that confusion is problematic.”).
33
See McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 32, at 282-87.
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speech,34 and the flow of useful market information.35 In response to
this, a range of scholars have thought that some form of “trademark use
theory” in the U.S. could serve as a threshold filter and thus limit the
“harmful effects” of the widening confusion-based test.36 However,
numerous equally distinguished scholars accept that the likelihood of
confusion test has gone too far but argue against the existence or the
application of a trademark use theory for a broad range of reasons. For
example, Professors Dinwoodie and Janis “reject the theory both
descriptively and prescriptively,”37 claiming that the absence of a
normative38 or doctrinal foundation39 for the inclusion of a trademark
use threshold means that it cannot “provide the certainty its proponents
promise.”40 Moreover, they claim that it may be counterproductive
because it undermines “transparent trademark decision making.”41
34

For an interesting discussion of the U.S. concept of free speech under the First Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution in a registration context, see Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. ___ , 137 S. Ct. 1744
(2017). See also Vicki Huang, Comparative Analysis of US and Australian Trade Mark
Applications for “The Slants”, 40 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 429 (2018).
35
See Margreth Barrett, Reconciling Fair Use and Trademark Use, 28 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENTERTAINMENT L. J. 1, 5 (2010). See also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1672 (“[W]e fear
. . . a world in which intermediaries, for fear of liability, fail to use consumer-generated trademark
signals at all in designing their business models. In this world, Amazon.com would hesitate before
recommending alternative, lower-cost electronics products to a consumer seeking an expensive
brand.”). Proponents also argue that this fetishization of consumer confusion can lead to
unjustified market appropriation, inefficient litigation and a distortion of adjunct doctrines, such
as secondary liability, where keyword cases involve attempts to impose third-party liability under
the guise of direct infringement suits.
36
See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1674 (“[T]he trademark use doctrine, properly applied,
serves as a limited tool for identifying classes of behavior that cannot constitute infringement.”);
Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of “Trademark Use”, 39 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 371, 395-96 (2006) (“In the course of evaluating infringement and dilution claims in this
new and unique setting [on the Internet], courts have too often lost sight of the important limiting
function the trademark use requirement should play.”); Uli Widmaier, Use, Liability, and the
Structure of Trademark Law, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603, 708 (2004) (“[T]he misinterpretation of
the trademark use requirement – or more accurately, the flat-out disregard of that requirement –
has given rise to a veritable cottage industry among the courts, an entire line of cases that are
wrongly decided, that impose trademark infringement liability where none exists . . . ”); Eric
Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L. J. 507, 593-94
(2005) (arguing that the Lanham Act provides a trademark use requirement that needs to be
applied to immunize search providers from liability).
37
Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1602.
38
Id. at 1667 (“Trademark use theory cannot be justified on a search costs rationale, and it will
not provide the certainty its proponents promise. By ignoring the multivalence of trademark law,
the theory threatens to undermine transparent trademark decision making. Instead, trademark law
should retain its traditional preference for contextualism and should place assessments of
confusion over supposedly deterministic characterizations of use.”).
39
Id. at 1667 (“The trademark use theory is flawed. It lacks a firm foundation in existing law, and
it would be counterproductive if adopted as a metaprinciple for future trademark law and
policy.”).
40
Id. at 1667.
41
Id. at 1667.
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They further argue that the use theory is overly formalistic42 and fails
to acknowledge the role of statutory defenses.43 It is in this scholarly
context that Dinwoodie and Janis critique the Australian trademark use
test.
C. Australian Trademark Infringement Law
In Australia, only registered marks are protected under the
Australian Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth). Trademark infringement
litigation that proceeds under Section 120(1)44 or 120(2)45 requires the
plaintiff to show “use as a trademark” by the defendant, and a level of
confusing “similarity” (substantial identity or deceptive similarity)
between the defendant’s and the plaintiff’s mark. The concepts of
consumer confusion are embedded in the considerations of similarity.
In addition, the impugned use must have a degree of “relatedness” with
respect to the goods or services for which the plaintiff’s mark is
registered. Section 120(3)46 further allows the plaintiff to pursue an
Id. at 1605 n.35 (“However, to the extent that the trademark use theory imposes on courts a
form of reasoning divorced from policy objectives, without any concomitant reduction in
administrative or error costs that might provide a utilitarian basis for such a departure . . . the
approach can fairly be characterized as inappropriately formalistic.”) (citations omitted).
43
Dinwoodie, supra note 10, at 99 (“I suggest that trademark law would be better served if several
of its limits were explicitly conceptualized as defenses to an action for infringement, that is, as
rules permitting unauthorized uses of marks even where such uses implicate the affirmative
concerns of trademark law and thus support a prima facie cause of action by the trademark owner
. . . . Conceiving of limits as defenses would help ensure that the (often unstated) values underlying
socially desirable third-party uses are not too readily disregarded if they happen to conflict with
confusion-avoidance concerns that are historically powerful drivers of trademark protection.”).
44
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 120(1) (Austl.) (“A person infringes a registered trade mark if
the person uses as a trademark a sign that is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to,
the trade mark in relation to goods or services in respect of which the trademark is registered.”).
45
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 120(2) (Austl.) (“A person infringes a registered trade mark if
the person uses as a trade mark a sign that is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar
to, the trade mark in relation to: (a) goods of the same description as that of goods (registered
goods) in respect of which the trade mark is registered; or (b) services that are closely related to
registered goods; or (c) services of the same description as that of services (registered services)
in respect of which the trade mark is registered; or (d) goods that are closely related to registered
services. However, the person is not taken to have infringed the trade mark if the person
establishes that using the sign as the person did is not likely to deceive or cause confusion.”).
46
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 120(3) (Austl.) (“A person infringes a registered trade mark if:
(a) the trade mark is well known in Australia; and (b) the person uses as a trade mark a sign that
is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, the trade mark in relation to: (i) goods
(unrelated goods) that are not of the same description as that of the goods in respect of which the
trade mark is registered (registered goods) or are not closely related to services in respect of which
the trade mark is registered (registered services); or (ii) services (unrelated services) that are not
of the same description as that of the registered services or are not closely related to registered
goods; and (c) because the trademark is well known, the sign would be likely to be taken as
indicating a connection between the unrelated goods or services and the registered owner of the
trade mark; and (d) for that reason, the interests of the registered owner are likely to be adversely
affected.”).
42
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infringement claim (subject to certain conditions) for use on
“unrelated” goods or services if the plaintiff’s mark is “well-known.”47
Therefore, to make out a claim for trademark infringement under
Section 120(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1995, the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant has used or proposes to use48 in Australia, a
substantially identical or deceptively similar sign as a trademark,49 in
relation to goods or services50 for which the plaintiff’s mark is
registered. Note that in Australia, the trademark use test requires the
plaintiff to show that the defendant is using the impugned mark as a
badge of origin to itself and not as an indication that the defendant’s
marked goods or services somehow come from the plaintiff.51
Unlike U.S. trademark infringement law, the Australian statutory
test proceeds in multiple parts and not as a multi-factor test for a single
concept of “likelihood of confusion.” In the U.S., the multi-factor tests
are “explicitly and uniformly applied in their respective circuits”52 and
“district courts give every appearance of scrupulously following a basic
weighted additive decision strategy.”53 Judges are obliged to discuss all
of the factors in the multi-factor test even if they are only tangential to
the substance of case.54 However, the broad elements of the Australian
statutory test – use, deceptive similarity (or substantial identity), and
relatedness – undergo no routinised scrutiny. For each of these
elements, there are no multi-factor tests nor is there a method with
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 120(4) (Austl.) (“In deciding, for the purposes of paragraph
(3)(a), whether a trade mark is well known in Australia, one must take account of the extent to
which the trade mark is known within the relevant sector of the public, whether as a result of the
promotion of the trade mark or for any other reason.”) (emphasis original).
48
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 7(4) (Austl.) (“[U]se of a trademark in relation to goods means
use of the trade mark upon, or in physical or other relation to, the goods (including second-hand
goods).”). Note that this provision reflects more the physical application of the mark rather than
its metaphysical “use,” which is dealt with in case law.
49
See Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 17 (Austl.) (“A trade mark is a sign used, or intended to be
used, to distinguish goods or services dealt with or provided in the course of trade by a person
from goods or services so dealt with or provided by any other person.”) (emphasis original).
50
See Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 6 (Austl.) (“goods of a person means goods dealt with or
provided in the course of trade by the person.”).
51
See E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 144, ¶ 43 (Austl.)
holding that “‘[u]se “as a trade mark” is use of the mark as a “badge of origin” in the sense that it
indicates a connection in the course of trade between goods and the person who applies the mark
to the goods . . . That is the concept embodied in the definition of “trade mark” in s 17 – a sign
used to distinguish goods dealt with in the course of trade by a person from goods so dealt with
by someone else.’ That statement should be approved.” (quoting Coca-Cola Co v All-Fect
Distributors Ltd (1996) 96 FCR 107, 115 (Austl.)).
52
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94
CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1594 (2006).
53
Id. at 1593 (emphasis original).
54
Note that from this Beebe was able to compute a stampeding score – a score showing the degree
to which the non-relevant factors were collapsed to satisfy the outcome of the test.
47
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which judges must examine the “use” or “deceptive similarity”
elements of an infringement case. Rather, judges begin with the broad
language of the statute and then apply the tests that have developed in
the relevant case law. In Australia, there are no “set” factors, and if an
element is irrelevant, the judge will likely not discuss it in a judgment.
Another critical difference is that in Australia, use at the time of
registration is not required, and, as a general principle, trademark rights
arise from registration. In contrast, in the U.S., trademark rights are
generally attained by “use” or “intention to use”55 and the scope of
rights is “defined by that party’s use.”56 However, it should be noted
that Australia and the U.S. are imperfect exemplars of registration and
use systems, respectively.57 The difficulties in trying to reconcile these
imperfect rights acquisition systems with laws relating to the
infringement of those rights have recently been explored in both a
U.S.58 and Australian59 context and are therefore not discussed here.
A relevant consequence of not requiring use at registration in
Australia is that when determining infringement, the court may need to
55

Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. §1051 (2012). For a discussion of the use and
misuse of the US registration system, in particular intent-to-use applications, see Barton Beebe,
Is the Trademark Office a Rubber Stamp? 48 HOUS. L. REV. 751 (2011) (finding that the number
of intent-to-use and use-based applications allowed since 1989 were similar). But see id. at 773
(“a large proportion of [intent-to-use] applications that were published . . . failed to survive to
registration . . . of these 84 percent failed because the applicant failed to file a statement of use.”).
56
McKenna, supra note 8, at 779.
57
Jane C. Ginsburg, Response: Euro-Yearnings? Moving Toward a “Substantive” RegistrationBased Trademark Regime, 130 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 95, 97-98 (2017) (noting that the Lanham
Act provides “incentives to register: perhaps most importantly by giving priority dating from
filing rather than from first use in commerce, and also by making trademark rights enforceable
nationwide,” but refusal does not “prevent the unsuccessful applicant from using the mark and
building up goodwill protectable by unfair competition claims both at state law under
section 43(a) . . . . The disparity between grounds for refusal to register and on-the-ground
acquisition of rights undermines the utility of registration even as it honors the role of consumer
perception in giving rise to trademark rights. Even the most significant recent development toward
convergence of registration and enforceable rights in fact underscores the disconnect between the
two regimes.”) (citations omitted).
58
See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Registering Disagreement: Registration in Modern American
Trademark Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 867, 881 (2017) (“In the United States . . . we have told
ourselves that both systems, registration and general protection against confusion, have the same
goals and the same mechanisms. The result has been increasing tension between irreconcilable
empirical and conceptual approaches to trademark problems.”).
59
Robert Burrell, Trademark Bureaucracies, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK
OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 95, 95 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2009) (“One
thing that is striking about these justifications [for trademark protection], however, is that they
provide little explanation of trademark registration. This disjuncture between the standard
justifications for trademark protection and the existence and operation of registered trademark
systems is significant, because having a registered trademark system requires a substantial
expenditure of resources.”) (emphasis original). See also Michael Handler & Robert Burrell,
Reconciling Use-Based and Registration-Based Rights within the Trademark System: What the
Problems with Section 58A of the Trade Marks Act Tell Us, 42 FED. L. REV. 91, 92 (2014).
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construct the scope of the plaintiff’s rights by assessing the plaintiff’s
hypothetical or potential use on the goods or services for which its
marks are registered.60 Some argue that infringement of the owner’s
rights (as defined by the scope of registration) is somewhat akin to the
exercise of a property right under a strict liability standard.61 This is
perhaps a logical outcome of the Australian Constitutional inclusion of
trademarks as a species of industrial property (akin to a patent).62
Another important point of distinction between Australian and
U.S. trademark law is that Australian litigants typically pursue
concurrent actions in common law passing off and misleading conduct
under federal consumer protection statutes (typically Section 18 of the
Australian Consumer Law).63 These actions are also available to
protect unregistered, common law marks and are very well developed.
In Australia, passing off provides broad protection for a trader’s
goodwill against certain kinds of misrepresentations by others, while
Section 18 of the Australian Consumer Law64 prohibits misleading and
deceptive conduct against consumers. In Australia, there is no general
tort of unfair competition.65 No doctrine of singular scope protects the
“sweat of the brow” or the products of intellectual effort. Rather,
traders need to seek relief under various “special heads”66 of protection.
60

See MID Sydney Pty Ltd v Australian Tourism Co Ltd & Ors (1998) 90 FCR 236, 245 (Austl.)
(“It is true, in infringement proceedings, that the question to be asked is in one respect at least
somewhat artificial: the person who may be caused to wonder is not one who knows of the actual
business of the proprietor of the registered mark, the goods it produces or the services it provides,
but one who is to be credited with a recollection of the mark in relation to the full range of goods
or services to which the registration extends. That degree of artificiality can be justified on the
ground that it is necessary in order to provide protection to the proprietor’s statutory monopoly to
it/s full extent.”).
61
See ROBERT BURRELL & MICHAEL HANDLER, AUSTRALIAN TRADE MARK LAW 370 (2nd ed.
2016) (ebook) (“Thus, on its face, s 120(1) seems to set up something like strict liability. In
contrast, a defendant can avoid liability under s 120(2) if it can establish that its use of the mark
‘is not likely to deceive or cause confusion.’”).
62
See JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia; British American Tobacco Australasia
Limited v The Commonwealth (2012) 250 CLR 1, ¶ 35 (Austl.) (per French CJ) (“Registered trade
marks, designs, patents and copyright in works and other subject matter give rise to, or constitute,
exclusive rights which are property to which s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution can apply. They are
all rights which are created by statute in order to serve public purposes.”). See also Megan
Richardson, Trade Marks and Language, 26 SYDNEY L. REV. 193, 203 (2004) (explaining that
the introduction of a formal register for trademarks is significant because it reflected the
understanding at the time that a mark denoted manufacturing or trade origin, that is, as a form of
industrial property).
63
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 s 18 (Austl.) (“(1) A person must not, in trade
or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive.
(2) Nothing in Part 3-1 (which is about unfair practices) limits by implication subsection (1).”).
64
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 (Austl.).
65
See Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd [No 2] (1984) 156 CLR 414 (Austl.).
66
See Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479, 509
(Dixon J) (Austl.) (In rejecting a general tort of unfair competition, the High Court held, “[t]his is
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D. Arguments for Why the US Should Adopt a Trademark Use
Test
U.S. trademark use advocates argue that adoption of a use
threshold could improve the efficiency of American trademark
disputes. However, use critics argue that an assessment of whether the
defendant has used the mark as a trademark is beleaguered by the
absence of a definition of use and could dissolve into a fact-dependent
consumer confusion analysis, rendering any efficiency gains
nugatory.67
Dinwoodie and Janis argue that trademark use as a limiting
doctrine cannot lead to greater certainty or efficiency in infringement
cases and that, historically, considerations of trademark use in the U.S.
ownership context have morphed into lengthy considerations of
consumers’ mental associations.68 They argue that imposing a
trademark use requirement would provoke the “development of
ancillary use doctrines” and these, in turn, would likely incorporate
considerations of consumer association and likely confusion.69 For
example, potential disputes may arise as to whether “advertising and
sales activities … amount to trademark use” or that trademark owners
may (too easily) raise “factual issues regarding consumer association
or confusion as pertinent to assessments of use,”70 returning the court
to the problematic issue of “consumer confusion” that a threshold use
test was supposed to cure.71
Dinwoodie and Janis also claim that international experience has
shown that trademark use does not make trademark infringement
litigation more efficient (i.e., by halting consideration if there is no
actual use made out to the defendant). Rather, citing the Australian
experience, they argue that the use threshold becomes bogged down by
the same consumer-dependent inquiries that plague the consumer
confusion test – for example, evidence of a consumer’s mental

sufficiently evidenced by the history of the law of copyright and by the fact that the exclusive
right to inventions, trade marks, designs, trade name and reputation are dealt with in English law
as special heads of protected interests, and not under a wide generalization.”).
67
Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1646-47 (“[A] trademark use requirement will become
fertile ground for the development of ancillary use doctrines, and that assessments of trademark
use are likely to incorporate considerations of consumer association and likely confusion. If this
were to happen, certainty would not be enhanced.”) (citations omitted).
68
Id. at 1646.
69
Id. at 1646.
70
Id. at 1647.
71
See id.; McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 32, at 298 (“Both of us have argued before that
these efforts were doomed because they required courts to consult the very same fickle consumer
perception that anchors the likelihood of confusion analysis.”).
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associations of the mark, considerations of advertising, and sales
activities of both parties – to establish or refute trademark use; evidence
of actual confusion is sought or experts or surveys are used to identify
potential confusion.72 Thus, the imposition of a well-defined use
threshold will not lead to any efficiency gains in litigation or certainty
for the parties.73
Citing Australia as a cautionary tale, Dinwoodie and Janis argue
that:
Recent international experience corroborates these concerns
over the fact-intensive nature of trademark use. For example,
the Australian Trademark Act expressly provides that a
trademark is infringed only when a sign is used “as a mark.”
But determining when a sign is used as a mark has proved
extremely difficult. In particular, Australian courts have felt
compelled to resort to contextual analysis, including evidence
of actual confusion, in order to characterize the defendant’s
use.74
The authors also argue that in 2007, the European Court of Justice
“seemed to endorse an approach tied closely to the factual question of
confusion (or related antecedents of association).”75 Dinwoodie and
Janis use this comparative analysis to argue that “trademark use is a far
more complex and fact-dependent concept than its advocates admit”
and therefore would not reduce litigation costs.76

72

Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1647.
Id. at 1646.
74
Id. at 1647 (citations omitted).
75
Id. at 1648-49 (“In that case, Adam Opel AG v. Autec AG, the plaintiff car manufacturer sued
a toy company that sold remote-controlled scale models of the plaintiff’s car bearing the plaintiff’s
mark. The defendant argued that its use on scale model cars was not ‘use as a mark’ and, thus,
was immune from liability under the German trademark statute. The Court did not say definitively
whether the defendant’s use was as a matter of law of the type that came within the scope of the
trademark owner’s rights. Instead the Court held that potential liability depended on whether the
relevant consumer ‘perceived the sign identical to the [plaintiff’s] logo appearing on the scale
models…as an indication that those products come from . . . [plaintiff] or an undertaking
economically linked to it.’ This formulation is, in essence, an analysis of likely confusion or, more
strictly, of antecedent consumer association that might in turn lead to confusion. The significance
of Adam Opel from an American perspective is that it reinforces the lessons drawn from the
Australian experience: trademark use is a requirement that ultimately will give way to an analysis
of consumer association or likely confusion.” (footnotes omitted)). In Australia (unlike the
German approach described above), the trademark use test requires the plaintiff to show that the
defendant is using the impugned mark as a badge of origin to itself and not as an indication that
those products come from the plaintiff. See E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd
(2010) 241 CLR 144, ¶ 43 (Austl.).
76
Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1649 (“if US courts followed the same approach, the
principal benefit claimed for the trademark use requirement – its purported gatekeeper function
and, thus, reduced litigation costs – disappears.”) (citations omitted).
73
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Some pro-trademark use advocates agree; for example, the most
vocal pro-use scholars, Professors Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley
concede the point that when determining whether the defendants are
using a sign as a mark, consumer perception needs to be assessed, thus
overlapping with the much-maligned consumer confusion analysis:
While we have no doubt about the existence of a trademark
use doctrine, Dinwoodie and Janis raise legitimate concerns
about the potential pitfalls of applying the doctrine at the
boundaries . . . . [W]e recognize that applying the use-as-amark requirement in every case would be counterproductive.
In some cases, evaluating whether a defendant is using a mark
as a trademark on its products requires inquiry into consumer
perceptions about the use – an inquiry that turns on many of
the same factors as the likelihood-of-confusion analysis.77
Nevertheless, they do not consider this complaint an
insurmountable hurdle and that trademark use overall would be of
benefit to trademark infringement inquiry.78 In contrast to Dogan and
Lemley, Professor McKenna (while not completely embracing
Dinwoodie and Janis’s arguments) has agreed that the consumer
association problems that could potentially plague a trademark use
inquiry render the trademark use doctrine of neutral benefit in terms of
providing a predictable limit to liability.79
E. The Goals of this Article
This article provides an empirical analysis of Australian
trademark law to determine the function of the trademark use test in
that jurisdiction.80 This article will use the results to challenge and
77

Dogan & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1682-83 (citations omitted). See generally Stacey L. Dogan
& Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.
J. 461 (2005).
78
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1673 (“Despite what Dinwoodie and Janis claim, we do not
view the trademark use doctrine as a panacea, a silver bullet, or a wonder theory. Indeed, as we
explore in this Article, the trademark use doctrine has significant limitations that curtail its
efficacy in marginal cases. Its real importance – and the place where the theory is gaining some
traction – is in curtailing an utterly new form of trademark claim against parties that do not
promote their own products or services under the protected mark.”).
79
McKenna, supra note 8, at 828 (“Trademark law is in desperate need of a reliable limiting
principle. Unfortunately, trademark use is not capable of filling that role. Although the Lanham
Act does condition liability on a defendant making a source-indicating use of the plaintiff's mark,
source indication, like virtually everything else in trademark law, can be determined only from
the perspective of consumers. In fact, it is precisely this reliance on consumer understanding, and
not courts’ failure to apply a robust trademark use doctrine, that is responsible for trademark law’s
perpetual expansion.”).
80
This article is drawn from a larger work in which all aspects of Australian trademark
infringement were examined. See Vicki T. Huang, A 20-Year Empirical Investigation of Trade
Mark Infringement Litigation in Australian Courts, 41 SYDNEY L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
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interrogate aspects of the U.S. trademark use debate. There are two
specific, interrelated goals. First, to examine whether the application of
the trademark use test results in efficiency gains compared with cases
that proceed to assessments of deceptive similarity; second, to look
more closely at how trademark use is determined by Australian courts
– specifically, to examine whether reasoning surrounding the
trademark use test involves considerations of factors inherent or
exogenous to the marks themselves. For example, in assessing
trademark use, do Australian courts (as suggested by Dinwoodie and
Janis) rely on labor-intensive considerations of advertising and sales
evidence or measures of consumer confusion from witnesses or
surveys? Such considerations determine the value of the gatekeeper
function of a trademark use test.
I.

METHODS

This article conducts a systematic content analysis81 of all
Australian infringement decisions under Section 120 of the Trade
Marks Act 1995 reported over a twenty-year period (January 1, 1996
through January 1, 2016) – 78 cases. Details regarding case selection
and coding of the decisions are set out in Appendix A.82 The methods
used in this article were inspired by Barton Beebe’s empirical study of
U.S. trademark infringement law.83
II.

RESULTS

The structure of the Section 120 inquiry sets out four core
elements: (1) trademark use by the defendant, (2) substantial identity,
(3) deceptive similarity with the plaintiff’s registered mark, and (4)
relevant similarity of goods and/or services. A logistic regression of 78
cases reveals that the most relevant elements for predicting a
Section 120 win in a single variable model84 is trademark use (p <
0.001) and deceptive similarity (p < 0.001). Courts did not significantly
engage with considerations of substantial identity (p = 0.401) or
similarities between goods and services (p = 0.323) in their written
judgments.

81

See Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96
CAL. L. REV. 63, 65-66 (2008) (“Content analysis works best when the judicial opinions . . . hold
essentially equal value . . . . [C]onventional legal scholarship analyzes issues presented in one
case or a small group of exceptional or weighty cases, content analysis works by analyzing a
larger group of similarly weighted cases to find overall patterns.”).
82
Also note recently published work based on the same data set. See Huang, supra note 80.
83
See Beebe, supra note 52, at 1586.
84
Multiple variable models factor in the co-linearity between variables.
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For the 49 (out of 78) cases where trademark use was discussed,
chi-square tests of association85 and frequency tables were performed.
It was found that when a court found the defendant was not using the
impugned sign as a trademark, the plaintiff lost the case 100 percent of
the time (20 of 20 cases). When the judge found positive use, that is,
that the defendant was using the impugned sign as a trademark, the
plaintiff won 83 percent of the time (24 of 29 cases). In the five cases
where the court found the defendant was using the impugned sign as a
mark but the plaintiff still lost, this was because the plaintiff failed a
subsequent element, for example, deceptive similarity.
Overall, the results confirmed what is prescribed by the statute –
if there is no trademark use by the defendant, the plaintiff will always
lose. These findings generate the following questions: if use is so
important, does use as a threshold ultimately lower the hearing days?
Further, what factors do judges use to make a use determination?
A. Trademark Use and Effect on Hearing Days
From a close reading of the cases, consistent with previous
studies,86 it became apparent that most Section 120 cases turned on one
or two significant issues – notably trademark use or deceptive
similarity, meaning one main element was generally dispositive of the
case. For example, if the judge could dispose of the case early by
finding the respondent had not “used” a mark as a trademark, the judge
did not tend to discuss deceptive similarity in depth.87 In such
85

Chi-square = 32.73, df = 2, p < 0.001 for association between trade mark use yes/no/NA and
Section 120 win/loss.
86
See Jason Bosland, Kimberlee Weatherall & Paul Jensen, Trade Mark and Counterfeit
Litigation in Australia, 2006 INTELL. PROP. Q. 347, 354-55 (“We collected data on the outcome
of each decision . . . separately recording the outcome on infringement and validity of each
trademark in dispute.”) (emphasis original); id. at 364 (“What we see in this data is that two
grounds frequently arose in original proceedings: first, whether the infringing sign was
‘deceptively similar’, and secondly, whether the alleged infringer’s sign was being ‘used as a
trademark.’ Notably, these grounds mirror the most common grounds raised on appeal: the most
frequent infringement issues raised (either successfully, or unsuccessfully) on appeal was whether
the infringing sign was ‘deceptively similar’ to the registered trademark (six instances), followed
closely by the question of whether the infringing sign was used ‘as a trademark’ (four instances).
One reason why these two grounds dominate is that most other grounds are tailored to very
specific circumstances – the issue of deceptive similarity will usually be one which parties in a
non-counterfeiting case can contest.”) (citations omitted).
87
There were seven cases where the judge found no trademark use but went on to discuss
deceptive similarity for reasons of thoroughness or in case of appeal. See, e.g., Lift Shop v Easy
Living Home Elevator (2013) 103 IPR 511, ¶ 46 (Austl.) (where the court found no use and that
“[t]hat conclusion makes it unnecessary to deal in detail with the case alleging deceptive
similarity. However, some short observations [regarding deceptive similarity] are in order.”); see
also Sanitarium Health Food v Irrewarra Sourdough (2012) 292 ALR 101, ¶ 38 (Austl.); Nature’s
Blend v Nestlé Australia (2010) 87 IPR 464, ¶¶ 24, 33 (Austl.); Sebel Furniture Ltd v Acoustic &
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circumstances, it could be said the case “turned on” use. An in-depth
look at each case was conducted to code each case for whether it
“turned on” a main element. This allowed for classification of cases
into mutually exclusive categories.

Table 1 Case Turns on a Main Legal Element by Hearing
Days
Use

Deceptive

Relatedness of

Combination

Similarity

Goods/Services

of Elements

No. of cases

27

27

10

14

Total hearing

84

117

27

64

3.1

4.3

2.7

4.6

days
Average
hearing days

Table 1 shows that cases that turned on the threshold issue of use
took 3.1 hearing days on average. In contrast, cases that turned on
deceptive similarity took 4.3 days to hear, which was 39 percent longer
than cases that resolved on use. This was not surprising given that use
is a “threshold test” prior to analysis of deceptive similarity. However,
the point is that contrary to U.S. critics’ arguments, “use” did not
prolong the hearing of a case. This begs the question, why? The next
section looks more closely at judicial reasoning regarding trademark
use in Australia.
B. What Factors Predict Trademark Use?
As discussed earlier, in Australia there is no multi-factor test to
assess trademark infringement or its elements, such as trademark use.
Therefore, for the purpose of this study, a multi-factor approach to
“use” was constructed from the language of the statute and cases
focused on use. These cases included those in relation to word marks
used on packaging,88 shape marks where functionality impacts
Felts Pty Ltd (2009) 80 IPR 244, ¶ 162 (Austl.); Agapitos v Habibi [2014] WASC 47, ¶ 68
(Austl.); Mid Sydney Pty Ltd v Australian Tourism Co Ltd (1998) 42 IPR 561 (Austl.); Top Heavy
Pty Ltd v Killin (1996) 34 IPR 282 (Austl.).
88
See, e.g., Nature’s Blend, 87 IPR 464 ¶19 (where the Full Court listed important factors as
follows: “Use as a trademark is use of the mark as a ‘badge of origin,’ a sign used to distinguish
goods dealt with in the course of trade by a person from goods so dealt with by someone else”)
(citations omitted); Johnson & Johnson Aust Pty Ltd v Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd (1991)
30 FCR 326, 347 (Austl.) (“A mark may contain descriptive elements but still be a ‘badge of
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assertions of use89, and Internet cases where use has been discussed in
the context of domain name registration,90 meta-tags, and keywords.91
Although many factors were initially hypothesized, some overlapped
or were found to be redundant. The six key constructed factors retained
for analysis are described below.
1. Factor #1: Immediate Context
In an Australian infringement case, the main “use” question for
the court is whether that mark is being used as a badge of origin. The
foundational case of Shell Co of Australia Ltd v Esso Standard Oil
(Australia) Ltd (hereinafter Oil Drop Case)92 dictates that context is
origin.’ ”); Shell Co of Aust v. Esso Standard Oil Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 407, 422 (Austl.); AnheuserBusch Inc v Budejovicky Budvar (2002) 56 IPR 182, ¶ 186 (Austl.) (“In determining the nature
and purpose of the impugned words, the court must ask what a person looking at the label would
see and take from it.”).
89
See Global Brand Marketing Inc v YD Pty Ltd (2008) 76 IPR 16, ¶¶ 61-64 (Austl.) (where
Sundberg J set out the principles relevant to the use of a shape as a trademark as follows: “The
principles relevant to use of shape as a trademark are now set out. a) A special shape which is the
whole or part of goods may serve as a badge of origin. However, the shape must have a feature
that is ‘extra’ and distinct from the inherent form of the particular goods . . . . b) Non-descriptive
features of a shape point towards a finding that such features are used for a trademark purpose.
Where features are striking, trademark use will more readily be found. For example, features that
make goods more arresting of appearance and more attractive may distinguish the goods from
those of others . . . . c) Descriptive features, like descriptive words, make it more difficult to
establish that those features distinguish the product. For example, the word COLA or an ordinary
straight walled bottle are descriptive features that would have limited trademark significance. . . .
d) Where the trademark comprises a shape which involves a substantial functional element in the
goods, references to the shape are almost certainly to the nature of the goods themselves rather
than use of the shape as a trademark . . . . For example, evidence that a shape was previously
patented will weigh against a finding that the shape serves as a badge of origin . . . . e) If a shape
or a feature of a shape is either concocted compared to the inherent form of the shaped goods or
incidental to the subject matter of a patent, it is unlikely to be a shape having any functional
element. This may point towards the shape being used as a trademark . . . . f) Whether a person
has used a shape or a feature of a shape as a trademark is a matter for the court, and cannot be
governed by the absence of evidence on the point . . . . g) Context ‘is all important’ and will
typically characterise the mark’s use as either trademark use or not . . .”) (citations omitted).
90
See Mantra Group Pty Ltd v Tailly Pty Ltd [No. 2] (2010) 183 FCR 450, ¶ 50 (Austl.) (where
Reeves J said “It has been doubted whether the mere registration of a domain name containing
the words of a trademark constitutes the use of those words as a trademark for the purposes of s
120 of the Trade Marks Act. However, if the registered domain name is linked to a website that
contains advertising material that promotes goods or services in relation to which the trademark
is registered, this combination of use could constitute use as a trademark under s 120 of the Trade
Marks Act. This is all the more so if the advertising material on the website also uses the words
of the trademark to promote the goods or services concerned. In considering whether these
situations constitute trademark use, it will be necessary to apply the general principles set out
above to the particular circumstances.”).
91
See, e.g., Accor Australia & New Zealand Hospitality Pty Ltd v Liv Pty Ltd (2017) 112 IPR 494
(Austl.); Complete Technology Integrations Pty Ltd v Green Energy Management Solutions Pty
Ltd [2011] FCA 1319 (Austl.).
92
Shell Co, 109 CLR 407.
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“all important.”93 In this article, context means immediate context of
the mark, that being “the totality of the packaging, including the way
in which the words are displayed in relation to the goods and the
existence of a label of a clear and dominant brand”94 or if “the sign is
used in advertising, the relevant context will include the surrounding
text.”95 What the defendant is using as its mark can refer to the
“positioning of the sign, the type of font, the size of words or letters
and the colors which are used, as well as how the sign is applied to
advertising materials or the packaging of the goods in relation to other
features.”96
The existence of a label that includes a clear and dominant brand
(that of the defendant) alongside an impugned mark may also be
relevant in determining the “purpose and nature of the impugned
words”.97 For example, in Beecham Group Plc v Colgate-Palmolive
Pty Ltd,98 the plaintiff’s impugned mark was MACLEANS and the
defendant’s use included a label presenting COLGATE
MAXCLEAN.99 Use of indicia, such as capital letters, to emphasize a
word may also be relevant.100 Assessment of the immediate context of
use can be contrasted with external context discussed below.
2. Factor #2: External Context
One of the U.S. critiques of the Australian use test was that
“Australian courts have felt compelled to resort to contextual analysis,
including evidence of actual confusion, in order to characterize the
defendant’s use.”101 This could include, for example, evidence of a
consumer’s mental associations of the mark, considerations of
advertising and sales activities of both parties to establish or refute
trademark use, finding evidence of actual confusion or use of experts
or surveys to identify potential confusion. The alleged judicial reliance
on context was said to defeat the purpose of a trademark use threshold,
meaning it would not lead to any efficiency gains in litigation or
93

Id. at 422 (per Kitto J).
Nature’s Blend v Nestlé Australia (2010) 87 IPR 464, ¶ 19 (Austl.).
95
Veda Advantage Ltd v Malouf Group Enterprises Pty Ltd (2016) 241 FCR 161, ¶115 (Austl.).
96
Christodoulou v Disney Enterprises Inc (2005) 156 FCR 344, ¶ 35 (Austl.).
97
See infra II. B. 5. Factor #5: Purpose and Nature of Use.
98
Beecham Group Plc v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd (2005) 66 IPR 254 (Austl.).
99
Id. See also Johnson & Johnson Aust Pty Ltd v Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd (1991) 30
FCR 326 (Austl.) (where the plaintiff’s mark was CAPLETS and the defendant’s use included
TYLENOL CAPLETS); Anheuser-Busch Inc v Budejovicky Budvar (2002) 56 IPR 182 (Austl.)
(where one of the plaintiff’s marks was BUDWEISER and one of the defendant’s labels presented
BUDWEISER BUDVAR).
100
See Pepsico Australia Pty Ltd & Anor v Kettle Chip Co Pty Ltd (1996) 135 ALR 192 (Austl.).
101
See Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1647.
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certainty for the parties.102 Determining whether Australian courts
actually rely on this type of context to determine use can challenge this
claim.
This factor is different from immediate context because it captures
context that is less proximate to the trademark itself. Factor 2 external
context refers to exogenous context that is far removed from the
physical mark itself, such as evidence of sales and marketing budgets
or considerations of industry practice. An Australian example of
external context analysis can be seen in the case of Veda Advantage
Ltd v Malouf Group Enterprises Pty Ltd103 where the court noted in its
use analysis that the plaintiff’s marks could be purchased as keywords
by the general public, including by the defendant and other
competitors. Purchase of the plaintiff’s marks triggered sponsored and
organic links to many companies, including to that of the defendant, its
competitors, and the plaintiff. These facts were held to be “far from
determinative” but “not irrelevant” to the finding that purchasing
keywords of the plaintiff was not trademark use but merely a reflection
of industry practice.104 Trademark use “critics” might see this
reasoning as opening the door to litigants introducing evidence of
exogenous factors (such as the market for keywords), thereby
extending the length and costs of litigation.
3. Factor #3: Reputation
Another type of external context includes considerations of the
level of fame of the plaintiff or its marks. Factor 3 relates to
considerations of fame, renown, or reputation of the parties or their
marks. This is analysed as a separate factor because there has been
concern even among Australian scholars that reputation should not be
considered when discussing a defendant’s use.105 For example,
Professor Mark Davison has criticized the court’s consideration of the
renown of the plaintiff’s mark in considering whether the defendant
had used the mark “BSS” in the case of Alcon Inc v Bausch & Lomb
(Australia) Pty Ltd.106 In Alcon, the court held the reputation of the
mark affected whether a consumer would see the defendant’s use of
“BSS” as a trademark or as a descriptive industry acronym for
“balanced salt solution.”

102

See Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1646.
Veda Advantage Ltd v Malouf Group Enterprises Pty Ltd (2016) 241 FCR 161 (Austl.).
104
Id., ¶ 124 (Katzmann J).
105
Mark Davison, Reputation in Trademark Infringement: Why Some Courts Think It Matters and
Why It Should Not, 38 FED. L. REV. 231, 240-41 (2010).
106
Alcon Inc v Bausch & Lomb (Australia) Pty Ltd (2009) 83 IPR 210 (Austl.).
103
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4. Factor #4: Consumer Confusion
This factor examines whether there is a lengthy, “fact intensive”
consideration of consumer association and likely confusion, which, as
Dinwoodie and Janis allege, includes “evidence of actual confusion, in
order to characterize the defendant’s use.”107 The type of confusion
relevant to this factor is narrowly defined. While consumer confusion
in relation to deceptive similarity is a statutory requirement, confusion
in relation to the question of whether the defendant is using its mark as
a trademark is a different question. For example, if the court needs to
determine whether PUMA is being used as a trademark on a
defendant’s T-shirt, do they consider evidence that consumers were
confused as to whether the use of PUMA was related to the famous
sportswear brand or as a reference to a big jungle cat (a non-trademark
descriptive use)?
5. Factor #5: Purpose and Nature of Use
This factor relates to whether the nature of the defendant’s use is
actionable trademark use or whether the defendant’s use was
descriptive,108 functional,109 common to the trade,110 or an otherwise
non-infringing use of the impugned mark. Conversely, distinctive
markings and invented words or phrases tend to indicate the sign is
being used as a trademark.111 Note that “purpose” does not refer to the
subjective intention of the alleged infringer.112 Rather, per the Oil Drop
Case,113 the question of purpose and nature is an objective inquiry.
First, “did the court consider the objective purpose and nature of the
impugned use?” (yes/no); if so, “did the court find it favored a finding
of trademark use?” (yes/no/not discussed).

107

See Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1647.
Descriptive features, like descriptive words, make it more difficult to establish that those
features distinguish the product. For example, the word COLA or an ordinary straight walled
bottle are descriptive features that would have limited trademark significance. See Mayne
Industries Pty Ltd v Advanced Engineering Group Pty Ltd (2008) 75 IPR 102, ¶¶ 61-62 (Austl.);
Coca-Cola Co v All-Fect Distributors Ltd (1996) 96 FCR 107, ¶ 25 (Austl.).
109
See Global Brand Marketing Inc v YD Pty Ltd (2008) 76 IPR 16, ¶ 54 (Austl.).
110
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 219 (Austl.) (permitting evidence of such trade usages to be
adduced in trademark actions or proceedings).
111
See, e.g., Beecham Group Plc v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd (2005) 66 IPR 254, ¶ 47 (Austl.).
112
See Sports Break Travel Pty Ltd v P & O Holidays Ltd (2000) 50 IPR 51, ¶ 14; Aldi Stores Ltd
Partnership v Frito-Lay Trading Co GmbH (2001) 190 ALR 185.
113
Shell Co of Aust v. Esso Standard Oil Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 407, 422 (Austl.).
108
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6. Factor #6: Policy Considerations
In Australia, “[t]rade mark use is a highly malleable instrument.
Often it is employed to secure important policy objectives.”114 For
example, attempts to extend a patent monopoly over a shape by way of
trademark law will be considered unfavorably. That is, “evidence that
a shape was previously patented will weigh against a finding that the
shape [now] serves as a badge of origin.”115 Whether the court makes
express policy considerations is noted under this factor.
a. Multi-Factor Model Relating to Trademark Use
There were 49 cases in which there was more than a negligible
discussion of use.116 Because there were only 49 cases in the sample
and six variables of interest, a regression analysis was not appropriate.
Instead, individual chi-square tests of association were performed. To
maintain a conservative approach appropriate to the small sample size,
the p-value of interest was reduced to p ≤ 0.01.

114

BURRELL & HANDLER, supra note 61, at 385.
Global Brand Marketing Inc v YD Pty Ltd (2008) 76 IPR 16, ¶ 61 (Austl.) (citing Koninklijke
Philips Electronics NV v Remington Products Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 100 FCR 90, ¶ 12 (Austl.);
Mayne Industries Pty Ltd v Advanced Engineering Group Pty Ltd (2008) 75 IPR 102, ¶ 69
(Austl.)).
116
Noting that the balance of the cases proceeded directly to another part of Section 120, such as
deceptive similarity.
115
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Table 2 Association Between Factors and Trademark
Use*
Use Factor

P-value for Chi-

Chi-Square Value

Square
Factor 1: Immediate context

< 0.001

19.24

Factor 2: External context

0.008

8.71

Factor 3: Reputation

1.000

0.21

Factor 4: Consumer

0.659

1.04

< 0.001

13.18

0.004

10.28

confusion
Factor 5: Purpose and nature
of use
Factor 6: Policy
considerations
*df = 2, n = 49, chi-square performed with 4,999 permutations

Noting the shaded rows in the table above, “immediate context”
and “purpose and nature” were statistically significant, having p values
< 0.001. The results also show that a third factor, “policy
considerations,” was associated with a trademark use finding (p =
0.004).
To examine how these three factors affected the trademark use
inquiry and whether that impact was positive or negative, frequency
tables were constructed. These examined whether the judge found the
factor (e.g., immediate context) relevant to the use inquiry and
compared this with whether trademark use was found. The frequency
tables and results of the chi-square test are shown in Table 3.
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Table 3 Frequency Cross Table for Factors that Influenced
Use
TM Use Outcome

Factor 1: Immediate Context
Not Relevant
No
Yes
Chi-Sq

No TM Use

5

14

1

Yes TM Use

16

3

10

Count

21

17

11

TM Use Outcome

19.24

< 0.001

49

Factor 5: Purpose and Nature of Use
Not Relevant
No
Yes
Chi-Sq p value

No TM Use
Yes TM Use

12
22

8
1

0
6

13.18

Count

34

9

6

49

TM Use Outcome

p value

Factor 6: Policy Considerations
Not Relevant
No
Yes
Chi-Sq

No TM Use
Yes TM Use

13
25

6
0

1
4

10.28

Count

38

6

5

49

< 0.001

p value
0.004

* df = 2, n = 49, chi-square performed with 4,999 permutations

Regarding “immediate context,” Table 3 shows that where a judge
provided negative commentary on the surrounding immediate context
of the mark, no trademark use was found 82 percent of the time (14 out
of 17 cases). Where there was positive discussion of the context of the
impugned mark, the judge found trademark use 91 percent of the time
(1 out of 11 cases). In other words, a finding on the immediate context
factor heavily influenced a finding for or against trademark use.
With regard to “purpose and nature,” where the judge found the
objective purpose of the defendant’s sign was that it be used as a mark,
the judge found trademark use 100 percent of the time (6 out of 6
cases). Where the purpose and nature of the mark was not trademark
use, the judge found no trademark use 89 percent of the time (8 out of
9 cases). This would indicate that a finding on the purpose and nature
of the defendant’s use is also reasonably dispositive of the use inquiry.
With regard to “policy,” there were 11 of 49 cases where a policy
objective was clearly articulated in relation to trademark use. Where
the policy discussion veered against trademark use – for example,
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where the court expressed concern over illegitimate monopolies117 –
the court found against trademark use 100 percent of the time (6/6
cases). Where the policy issue did not find against use, the court found
trademark use 80 percent of the time (4/5 cases).
b. Factors with Less Influence on Trademark Use
Given the small sample size, a conclusion that factors are
irrelevant should not be inferred. Rather, the statistics reveal that some
factors have little association or predictive strength when they are the
subject of judicial reasoning in relation to trademark use.

Mayne Industries Pty Ltd, 166 FCR 312 (which involved a prior patent for an “S” shaped fence
dropper); Christodoulou v Disney Enterprises Inc (2005) 156 FCR 344 (Austl.) (where the
plaintiff attempted to monopolize a book title, “The Hunchback of Notre Dame”); Koninklijke
Philips Electronics NV, 91 FCR 167 (where the plaintiff tried to protect a functional shaver head
shape).
117
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Table 4 Frequency Cross Table for Factors that were Less
Influential on Use
TM Use Outcome

Factor 2: External Context
Not Relevant
No
Yes
Chi-Sq

No TM Use

12

7

1

Yes TM Use

25

1

3

Count

37

8

4

TM Use Outcome

8.71

p value
0.008

49

Factor 3: Reputation
Not Relevant

No

Yes

Chi-Sq

p value

No TM Use
Yes TM Use

17
25

2
2

1
2

0.21

1.000

Count

42

4

3

49

TM Use Outcome

Factor 4: Consumer Confusion
Not Relevant
No
Yes
Chi-Sq

No TM Use
Yes TM Use

13
21

5
4

2
4

1.04

Count

34

9

6

49

p value
0.659

* df = 2, n = 49, chi-square performed with 4,999 permutations

Table 4 shows that these factors were not associated with a
trademark use outcome: “reference to external context” (p = 0.008);
“reputation of the mark or the parties” (p = 1.000), and “reference to
consumer confusion” (p = 0.659). In the cases where comments were
made with regard to external context, reputation, or confusion, the
court’s decision on use could be either positive or negative. In other
words, these factors were not influential or not strongly predictive of a
trademark use outcome.
C. Summary of Results
In summary, a regression analysis of all 78 cases showed that
trademark use and deceptive similarity were determinative elements in
Section 120 trademark infringement litigation. Further analysis
revealed trademark use cases resolved 39 percent more quickly than
cases that went on to consider the question of deceptive similarity.
Turning to the subset of 49 cases where trademark use was discussed,
three factors were predictive of a trademark use finding: an assessment
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of the immediate context of the mark, the purpose and nature of the
defendant’s use, and consideration of policy issues. In general, the
approach of the court was to look at the immediate context of the mark,
such as the surrounding packaging. Then the court objectively
determined the purpose and nature of that use, such as descriptive,
decorative, or trademark use. Courts then discussed any policy
considerations in relation to infringing use. In contrast, there was little
consideration (or equivocal consideration) of factors relating to the
external context of the mark, the reputation of the parties or their marks,
or considerations of consumer confusion.
It is significant that the two main factors the courts considered –
immediate context and purpose and nature – relate to the inherent
nature of the mark. It is argued here that the court’s containment of
reasoning to endogenous factors keeps the trademark use assessment
efficient by attaching the inquiry to an object (i.e., the impugned mark)
to which both sides can identify.
Interestingly, a discussion of policy issues correlated with the
outcome of trademark use. These cases involved policy issues relating
to descriptive words,118 test cases involving Internet use,119 shape
marks,120
illegitimate
monopolies,121
certifications,122
and
disclaimers.123 In making these policy determinations, courts expressly
stated their objective, for example, that monopolies over functional
shapes are wrong.124 Australian courts did not gloss their reasoning
118

See, e.g., Australian Health and Nutrition Association Ltd v Irrewarra Estate Pty Ltd (2012)
292 ALR 101 (Austl.) (litigating over the use of the word GRANOLA); South Australian Brewing
Co Pty Ltd v Carlton & United Breweries Ltd (2001) 185 ALR 719 (Austl.) (litigating over the
use of the word SHOWDOWN).
119
See, e.g., Complete Technology Integrations Pty Ltd v Green Energy Management Solutions
Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1319 (Austl.) (involving meta-tags); Ward Group Pty Ltd v Brodie & Stone
Plc (2005) 143 FCR 479 (Austl.) (involving sale of goods via the Internet); Buchanan Group Pty
Ltd v Sorgetti [2002] FCA 1646 (Austl.) (involving cyber-squatting).
120
See, e.g., Sebel Furniture Ltd v Acoustic & Felts Pty Ltd [No 2] (2009) 80 IPR 244 (Austl.)
(where the plaintiff tried to claim infringement of a chair shape).
121
See, e.g., Mayne Indus Pty Ltd v Advanced Eng’g Group Pty Ltd (2008) 166 FCR 312 (Austl.)
(which involved a prior patent for an “S” shaped fence dropper); Christodoulou v Disney Enter
Inc (2005) 156 FCR 344 (Austl.) (where the plaintiff attempted to monopolize a book title, “The
Hunchback of Notre Dame)”; Koninklijke Philips Elec NV v Remington Products Australia Pty
Ltd (1999) 91 FCR 167 (Austl.) (where the plaintiff tried to protect a functional shaver head
shape).
122
See, e.g., Halal Certification Authority Pty Ltd v Scadilone Pty Ltd (2014) 107 IPR 23
(illegitimate halal certifications).
123
See, e.g., Edgetec Int’l Pty Ltd v Zippykerb (NSW) Pty Ltd (2012) 98 IPR 1 (Austl.).
124
See, e.g., Sebel Furniture Ltd v Acoustic & Felts Pty Ltd [No 2] (2009) 80 IPR 244, ¶ 144
(Austl.) (“A shape cannot function as a trade mark if it is something that other traders may
legitimately wish to use either because it is inherent to the particular goods (i.e. it is of their
nature) or because it provides some technical or functional benefit to the goods.”) (emphasis
original) (citing Koninklijke Philips Elec NV v Remington Products Australia Pty Ltd (1999) 91
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with strained concerns for consumer confusion. This is perhaps another
benefit of having a use threshold that is separate from a “confusing
similarity” or “likelihood of confusion” test.
III.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Acknowledging that the U.S. trademark use debate touches on
many unique aspects of U.S. trademark law – such as an extensive
“trademark rights from use” jurisprudence, for which no parallel exists
in Australia125 – this article defends the Australian trademark use test
from Dinwoodie and Janis’s critique and provides some discussion of
why the test works in Australia. Dinwoodie and Janis claim,
“Australian courts have felt compelled to resort to contextual analysis,
including evidence of actual confusion, in order to characterize the
defendant’s use.”126
However, analysis of the cases in this data set show that the
determinative factors of use are actually endogenous to the marks
themselves. While there is some contextual analysis, the persuasive
analysis is not the exogenous context proscribed by Dinwoodie and
Janis. Instead, Australian courts typically assess use with reference to
the immediate context of the mark and then assess whether the
objective purpose of the use is as a badge of origin. If courts discuss
factors outside the inherent features of the mark (such as evidence of
confusion), such assessments are generally not determinative of the
trademark use question. Moreover, the data reveals that the Australian
trademark use test is operating as an effective threshold test or limiting
doctrine. The determination of trademark use (particularly a finding of
the absence of trademark use by the defendant) allows cases to resolve
before a lengthy discussion of similarity between the marks is required.
Thus, cases that turn on use resolve 39 percent more quickly than cases
that pass through a subsequent deceptive similarity analysis.
This article posits that there are three distinctive features of the
Australian trademark system that make a trademark use threshold
successful as an efficiency tool in Australia. First, the concept of a
trademark as property and the underlying idea of infringement as akin
FCR 167 (Austl.)); Kenman Kandy Australia Pty Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks (2002) 122
FCR 494, ¶ 137 (Austl.) (“Were the 1995 Act to enable the registration of a trade mark that
would give the owner a monopoly over functional features it would indeed have made a radical
change to trade mark law.”).
125
As an example of a jurisdiction specific, trademark rights by use discussion, see Dinwoodie &
Janis, supra note 5, at 1643 (discussing developments of ancillary use doctrines, such as token
use in the context of establishment of rights cases, to illustrate the point that use “is no prescription
for determinacy.”).
126
Id. at 1647.
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to a strict liability harm. In Australia, unlike the U.S., a trademark is
defined as a species of intellectual property in the Constitution akin to
copyright and patents.127 As a proprietary right, it can be argued that
infringement under Section 120(1) has historically been akin to
trespass. Thus, correction of confusion prior to sale (as with correcting
a physical trespass to land), has been irrelevant to a finding of statutory
trademark infringement although remedial mitigation may relate to
damages. This proprietary concept leaves little room for reliance on
consumer confusion to establish the wrong.
A second difference is the absence of a general tort of unfair
competition in Australia. In the U.S., trademark law sits under a
broader head of unfair competition law (which has a strong focus on
preventing consumer confusion) and which McKenna argues makes
U.S. trademark law inherently unstable.128 The absence of a broad
doctrine of unfair competition in Australia has meant that trademark
jurisprudence has developed in line with doctrines relating to industrial
property.
The third distinctive aspect has been access to alternative “special
heads” of protection129 in the form of unfair competition such as
passing off and Section 18 of the Australian Consumer Law.130 These
causes of action privilege arguments around consumer confusion as to
trade source or confusion as to sponsorship or licensing. Access to
these collateral claims removes the pressure from statutory trademark
law to expand under the rhetoric of consumer confusion.
These distinctive features of the Australian trademark system (and
the utility of a trademark use threshold test) can be seen when
comparing litigation relating to trademarks and the Google Ads system.
Dogan points out that much of the US trademark use debate centers on
the use and misuse of the Google Ads system.131 In the U.S., courts
have strained to craft novel doctrines – such as initial interest confusion
127

See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
See generally Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA
L. REV. BULLETIN 63 (2009).
129
See Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479, 509
(Dixon J) (Austl.) ("This is sufficiently evidenced by the history of the law of copyright and by
the fact that the exclusive right to inventions, trade marks, designs, trade name and reputation
are dealt with in English law as special heads of protected interests, and not under a wide
generalization.”).
130
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 s18 (Austl.). Out of the 78 cases studied, 52
cases included collateral claims. For more detailed analysis into the reasons and efficacy of
collateral claiming, see Huang, supra note 80.
131
Dogan, supra note 20, at 137 (“Virtually all of the scholars who oppose a trademark use
doctrine have voiced the same fear – that a trademark use requirement would give search engines
(or, let's be honest, Google) carte blanche to adopt advertising practices that purposefully deceive
consumers.”). Note that GoogleAds were formerly known as “Google AdWords” until July 25,
2018.
128
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– to deal with the potential misdirection from use of another’s
trademarks as a metatag, keyword, or Google Ad keyword.
The Google Ads program allows a potential defendant to buy a
plaintiff’s trademark via auction as a “keyword,” so that when a
consumer searches using that plaintiff’s mark, Google may return
results that highlight the defendant’s URL at the top or side of the
search-page, typically distinguished via shading, or the words “Ad” or
“sponsored”. Upon reviewing the search results, the consumer may be
diverted and click on the defendant’s URL rather than the plaintiff’s. A
plaintiff wanting to pursue the defendant or Google in this scenario
would not be able to do so under Australian statutory trademark law
because of the trademark use threshold.
For example, the plaintiff would have to show that the defendant’s
use (of the plaintiff’s trademark) in the Google Ad system was being
seen by the consumer as a form of trademark use by the defendant.
However, the fact that the consumer cannot see the transaction between
the defendant and Google means there is no relevant trademark use
between the defendant and the consuming public. In addition, when
looking at the defendant’s representations to Google, such as their
auction bids on the plaintiff's trademarks that would be visible to
Google, the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s trademark would not be
considered use as a badge of origin.
To find Google (as opposed to the defendant) liable for trademark
infringement, a plaintiff would have to show that Google, either by
operating its Google Ad auctions or displaying ads generated by the
auctions, was using the plaintiff’s mark as a trademark to indicate
source to itself. It is difficult to imagine a scenario where a consumer
would ever see this use as trademark use by Google. Even if the
consumer did see the mark (for example, if the plaintiff’s trademark
appeared on screen in juxtaposition with the defendant’s goods), the
consumer would not interpret the use of that trademark as use by
Google as Google’s own badge of origin.132
The trademark use test means that cases against intermediaries
such as Google must pursue a different legal path. In Australia, that
well-beaten path is either under passing off, or a misleading and
deceptive conduct claim under Section 18 of the Australian Consumer
Law, or both. In Australia, cases against intermediaries, such as
Google, have been brought in Australian courts under these flexible
(yet demanding) causes of action.133 The flexibility in these causes of
132

Huang, supra note 22, at 53-54.
See Google Inc v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2013] HCA 1, ¶ 83
(Austl.) (unanimously holding that Google had not engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct
133

32

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 35

action has meant that unlike in the U.S., new internet-related
infringements have not provoked doctrinal acrobatics in Australian
statutory trademark law. The underlying concept of the trademark as
property and the resistance to a general tort of unfair competition
shields statutory trademark law from radical expansion.
It is not suggested that the US adopt an Australia style trademark
use test. While the Australian property approach may appear to be
cleaner than litigating disputes as to consumer confusion, it does prima
facie make the infringement inquiry more sensitive to judicial
subjectivity which may trigger its own sets of distortions. And, it is
acknowledged that the structural factors of Australian trademark law
have developed in a different way to those in the U.S. Nevertheless, it
is hoped that this article and the empirical findings regarding the
benefits of a trademark threshold test can reinvigorate aspects of the
U.S. trademark use debate.
APPENDIX A: THE SELECTION AND CODING OF DECISIONS
A. Case Selection
The data for this article includes trademark infringement cases
litigated under Section 120 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 up until Jan.
1, 2016. The initial goal was to identify as many cases as possible. The
cases were located using broad keyword searches in the Lexis Nexis
AU Legal database – ‘all subscribed Australian case sources’ for all
Australian jurisdictions. Keywords included ‘trademarks’ and
‘infringement’ dated between January 1, 1996, and January 1, 2016.
This broad search revealed 2,355 cases before duplicates were
eliminated. Separately a similar search was run in a second database
(Westlaw AU) and cross-checked against the Lexis Nexis AU list. This
unearthed a small handful of additional cases.134 The final cross-check
was done against a case list generated from the Austlii.edu.au database.
No further additions were required.
Cases that were solely “passing off” or solely breach of Section 18
of the Australian Consumer Law (formerly Section 52 of the Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth)) were excluded from the search results,
although cases that decided trademark infringement actions with
contrary to Section 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) by publishing “sponsored links” in
response to web page searches and as a general proposition, that it is the advertiser and not the
intermediary search engine that is liable for the content of web advertising). Note that Section 52
of the Trade Practices Act was replaced and misleading or deceptive conduct is now regulated
under Section 18 of the Australian Consumer Law.
134
E.g., Société Des Produits Nestlé SA v Christian [No 4] [2014] FCCA 2968 (Austl.) (where the
absence was reported and now rectified).
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parallel actions in passing off or Section 18 of the Australian Consumer
Law were included. Similar to Beebe’s study of US trademark
infringement cases, those judgments that focused on ownership
disputes, parallel imports, the earlier Trade Marks Act 1955, procedural
issues, discovery issues, costs, damages, copyright, patents, designs
law, or contract interpretation were removed for lack of a substantial
discussion of the law of trademark infringement.135 As with Beebe’s
study, cases dealing with counterfeits and first instance decisions that
were reversed on appeal were removed from the analysis. Previous
Australian studies have found that counterfeit cases are a distinct
“world of trademark enforcement”136 and not representative of typical
proceedings. Trademark use and deceptive similarity are not disputed
issues in these cases and the defendant is often unrepresented or fails
to appear.137 The proceeding is quickly disposed of138 and the trademark
owner typically wins.139 Counterfeit cases were identified by the
designation “counterfeit” in the headnote. “Counterfeit” is not a term
defined in the Act; however, Australia is a signatory to the TRIPS
Agreement wherein “counterfeit” is defined as the use of an identical
trademark on goods or of a mark which “cannot be distinguished in its
essential aspects’ from the owner’s mark.”140
See Beebe, supra note 52, at 1650 (“I excluded a small minority of fact patterns that led courts
to apply the multifactor test in ways that could skew the results of the study. In most counterfeiting
opinions, for example, the likelihood of confusion is very clear and the factors tend to weigh
overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiff. The same is true of opinions involving an alleged breach
of a franchising, licensing, or distribution agreement. These opinions were thus excluded from the
sample. For similar reasons, I also excluded opinions on motions to dismiss or on motions where
the non-moving party failed to appear. I retained and noted opinions involving claims of reverse
confusion, and fact patterns in which the defendant repackaged plaintiff’s goods.”) (citations
omitted).
136
See, e.g., Bosland et al., supra note 86, at 366.
137
Id. at 347 (Bosland, Weatherall and Jensen used a dual analysis finding that “[a]nalysing the
nature and outcomes of the trademark litigation, we found a more complex story than previous
studies: counterfeit proceedings where the trademark owner always wins and the alleged infringer
often fails to show up in court on the one hand; and more contentious proceedings on the other,
where the trademark owner only succeeded around one-third of the time.”).
138
Vicki Huang, Kimberlee Weatherall & Elizabeth Webster, The Use of Survey Evidence in
Australian Trademark and Passing Off Cases, in THE LAW OF REPUTATION AND BRANDS IN THE
ASIA PACIFIC 181, 189 (Andrew T. Kenyon et al. eds., 2012). On average, counterfeiting cases
took 1.1 hearing days, compared with 2.4 days for passing off and trademark infringement, which
illustrates the less complicated nature of the former.
139
See, e.g., Bosland et al., supra note 86, at 366.
140
TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197,
Article 51 note 14 (1994) (“[F]or the purposes of this Agreement: (a) ‘counterfeit trademark
goods’ shall mean any goods, including packaging, bearing without authorization a trademark
which is identical to the trademark validly registered in respect of such goods, or which cannot
be distinguished in its essential aspects from such a trademark, and which thereby infringes the
rights of the owner of the trademark in question under the law of the country of importation.”).
135
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Only Section 120 infringement cases were considered relevant.141
As in Beebe’s study, only cases that provided a “substantial discussion”
of Section 120 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 were included.
“Substantial” was defined liberally as “any use beyond the mere
citation without analysis of the test.”142 Therefore, opposition cases that
may have discussed relevant aspects of the law, such as Section 10 of
the Trade Marks Act 1995 (deceptive similarity), were excluded. For
example, Section 41 distinctiveness and Section 44 deceptive
similarity cases were excluded. Cases that focused solely on Section 17
“use as a trademark” were also excluded if they were discussed outside
of a Section 120 determination.
As with Beebe’s study, only first instance decisions that were not
reversed on ultimate appeal were included.143 This meant that for all
cases, it was determined whether the Section 120 portion of the
decision underwent subsequent appeals.144 Twenty-two cases went to
the Full Federal Court of Appeal, of which two proceeded to the High
Court. Seventy-eight cases remained after the removal of appeals and
first instance cases where the Section 120 finding was reversed. The
full list of 78 cases and further details regarding case selection is
available from the author.
B. Coding the Cases
A major structural difference between U.S. trademark
infringement law and Australian law is that the Australian statutory test
proceeds in multiple parts and not as a multi-factor test for a single
concept of “likelihood of confusion.” In Australia, the statute sets forth
This definition of “counterfeit,” as applied by Bosland et al., supra note 86, has been cited by
the South African Supreme Court of Appeal (the highest court of appeal in South Africa in nonconstitutional law matters) in Cadac Inc v Weber Stephen Products Company 2011 (1) All SA 1
(SCA) at 343 (S. Afr.), and more recently, by the Federal Court of Australia in Geneva
Laboratories Ltd v Nguyen (2014) 110 IPR 295 (Austl.).
141
For example, the following cases use the phrase “trademark infringement” but provide no
discussion of Section 120: Oxford Funding Pty Ltd v Oxford Asia-Pacific Inv Pty Ltd [2005]
FCA 1637 (Austl.); Virgin Enter Ltd v Virgin Home Loans Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1175 (Austl.).
142
Beebe, supra note 52, at 1649.
143
Id. at 1650 (“[From] a sample of 337 opinions he excluded the six opinions in which the
outcome of the multifactor test was reversed, which yielded a final sample of 331 opinions.”).
144
The methodology demanded that Section 120 reversals be removed from the data set. The
consequence of this was that six well-known trademark cases were eliminated from the data set.
These include: Frito-Lay Trading Co GmbH v Aldi Stores Ltd P’ship (2001) 52 IPR 410 (Austl.);
Coca-Cola Co v All-Fect Distrib Ltd t/as Millers Distrib Co (1998) 43 IPR 47 (Austl.);
Mobileworld Communc’n Pty Ltd v Q & Q Global Enter (2003) 61 IPR 98 (Austl.); E & J Gallo
Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd (2008) 77 IPR 69 (Austl.); Starr Partners Pty Ltd v Dem
Prem Pty Ltd [No 2] (2006) 70 IPR 113 (Austl.); Symbion Pharmacy Services Pty Ltd v Idameneo
(No 789) Ltd (2011) 91 IPR 547 (Austl).
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three broad elements (or, more precisely, threshold tests) – “use” (as a
trademark); “similarity between marks” (i.e., substantial identity or
deceptive similarity); and “relatedness between goods and/or services”
– within which multiple factors are at play. Deciding the outcome of
each of these elements requires consideration of a number of what this
article calls “factors.” Thus, rather than a linear, multi-factor inquiry,
the Australian test proceeds as a matrix. This affects the coding of data.
Beebe was able to use binary coding, that is, a yes/no answer was
recorded in answer to his question of whether multi-factor “X” affected
the outcome of the likelihood of confusion test. The pilot study
revealed that this was not optimal for the Australian infringement test.
For example, in Australia, a judge may consider aural similarity
in a judgment, but this may only be in the context of recitation of prior
case dicta. That is, mere mention of this factor may not relate to judicial
reasoning of the merits of the case. To record the fact that “aural
similarity” was mentioned, a code for “yes – discussed” was noted. A
second round of coding was applied to examine whether the discussion
of “aural similarity” was relevant to infringement (yes/no/neutral). For
example, in this second round of coding, “yes” would mean that a
discussion of aural similarity occurred, and it favored the plaintiff’s
case. If coded “no,” this would mean a discussion of aural similarity
occurred which went against the plaintiff’s case. If coded “neutral,”
this meant a discussion of aural similarity occurred but had no
meaningful effect on the plaintiff’s Section 120 of the Trade Marks Act
1995 case.
1. Case Details
Twenty-eight variables were recorded in relation to general case
details. This included general descriptive aspects, such as date, hearing
days, judge, and court (including Fast Track). Grounds of suit were
coded, including Section 120(1)-(3), passing off, and/or Section 18 of
the Australian Consumer Law. Whether there was a win/loss or
whether the result was unclear (e.g., remitted) was coded. Where the
hearing and the judgment were heard and delivered within the same
day, this was counted as zero days. Otherwise, the hearing length was
estimated as one day unless further dates were listed in the header of
the judgment.
A difficulty with coding arose as for any one case, there could be
at least one or multiple trademarks in suit. Beebe coded per case rather
than per trademark. Similarly, Huang et al.145 coded by case and not by

145

Huang et al., supra note 13, at 185.

36

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 35

trademark. Win/loss was determined by case and not by mark.
Therefore, if there were multiple marks litigated and one win, the case
was coded as a “win” overall.
2. Coding for Trademark Use
Twenty potential variables of interest (derived from the
foundation cases and literature) were recorded in relation to trademark
use. These included factors that were exploratory in nature. After the
pilot study, this was reduced to ten. For the purpose of this article, the
variables of interest were reduced to six. For each element, whether a
variable was discussed or mentioned was recorded. For example, if
reputation was mentioned, it was coded “yes.” If it was not mentioned,
it was coded “no.” The next question was whether or not the discussion
favored a finding of infringement. For example, if the discussion of a
plaintiff’s reputation favored a finding of infringement, it was coded as
“yes.” If the plaintiff’s reputation favored a finding of no infringement,
it was coded “no.” If the plaintiff’s reputation was merely mentioned
but not factored into the judge’s infringement reasoning, it was coded
“neutral.”

